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Ainsi le symbole se manifeste d’abord comme meurtre de la chose, et cette mort constitue dans le sujet 
l’éternisation de son désir 
Jacques Lacan
Human existence is a contradictory 
thing. We are conscious beings: we 
attempt to know ourselves and the 
world that we are thrown into. But the 
instrument through which we attempt 
to do so, language, forestalls this 
knowledge rather than facilitating it. 
‘Things’, ‘objects’, ‘artefacts’, 
‘concepts’, they are merely words. 
Here, philosophy finds itself in a 
deadlock position. Pointing to, naming 
or representing replaces experiencing, 
allowing or bringing into contact. It 
‘immediately’ abolishes the immediate, 
makes it into something mediated. 
How can we perceive of any human 
attempt to diagnose our forlorn state 
and open up the window to the real as 
anything but futile?  
This exhibition lends its name from a 
notorious phrase of the philosopher 
Edmund Husserl; ‘zu den Sachen 
selbst’ is notorious because for those 
who follow him, his phenomenological 
ideas seem to imply a reduction of 
knowledge of things to knowledge of 
appearances. Both philosophy and art 
investigate the relation between us, our 
perception of the world and that world 
itself. And as such, they struggle with 
similar ambiguities. Here, I would like 
to write about the hidden concreteness 
of things. 
 
Meurtre de la chose 
In our attempts to grasp the world of 
things, we name them. We find 
concepts for them, referred to through 
symbols. This ability to name things is 
deeply intertwined with our ability to 
be a self: to demonstrate the faculty of 
personhood. Naming the world is 
where we start being a ‘me’; here, we 
start being able to say ‘I am I’. Whilst 
our cat may venture into the garden, 
come back with a mouse, and show 
pride, and a dog may have nibbled the 
corner of my ancient Persian rug, and 
show guilt, neither can show an 
awareness of themselves as themselves, 
of themselves as a self in its being in 
this world. They may have wanted to 
catch the mouse or destroy the carpet, 
but they cannot name it, nor can they 
name themselves in their desire to 
catch and destroy. This remains 
momentary.  
Words are the death of things. In 
naming the world, we are able to name 
ourselves. By naming things, they 
become ours. They are frozen in the 
mind’s gaze, and in their name, they 
become fixed. This fixation is a 
manifestation of our desire to make 
the world of things ours. But what is 
‘real’, the world of concrete and living 
things gets to be postponed. It veils 
itself. Becoming aware of ourselves as 
a self by naming the world amounts to 
a murder of the real, in favour of the 
conceptual, the reference, the image: 
that which poses as real but merely 
replaces it.  
 
Irreducibles 
Self-knowledge is supposed to open 
one’s mind to the world. But for some, 
self-knowledge, understood as 
investigating the nature of our ways, 
may as much close it off. In both art 
and philosophy there has been a 
tendency to lock us into discourse, and 
this unfortunately robs us of the ability 
to experience 'thingly' nature.  
With ‘thing’, I do not mean any 
specific object. I do not mean a table, 
or a chair, or a stone, nor to the 
elements we presume they are 
composed of. I do not refer to atoms, 
molecules, and although similarly 
evasive, it is not the Higgs-Boson 
particle I refer to either. Nor do I 
mean planets or moons. These are all 
constructions that are in one way or 
another functional to us. I do not 
mean to refer to objects as we know 
them, I mean to refer to their backside: 
that of which we do have experience, 
but have not yet named. The ‘object’ 
is, literally, what is already thrown 
before us. The ‘thing’ is more viscous 
and resists such passive states. It does 
not have qualities, it is quality itself.  
Both philosophy and art have 
increasingly concentrated on the 
medium of expression, rather than on 
what is expressed. Both have 
concentrated on the shape of the 
instrument of representation, rather 
than on its thingly nature, or the 
thingly nature of what it attempts to 
represent. As a result, no reality is 
acknowledged outside of the structures 
of language, society, culture etc: in 
these views, all is ‘linguistically 
determined’, ‘socially determined’, or 
‘culturally determined’ (with, of course, 
an exception of the school of thought 
in question). This has led to a 
philosophy on philosophy and an art 
on art.  
Words on words on how to avoid 
words on words is the pitfall for both 
art and philosophy. They are part of a 
sad, postmodern stance: its ponderings 
are merely a symptom of an unjustified 
mentality without hope that masks 
itself as irony. The relativist turn 
implies that we can never gain a 
position outside of the structures that 
govern our ways of experiencing and 
knowing the world. We can’t even 
know the nature of our ignorance, the 
limitations defined by these structures.  
As soon as one tries to gain access to 
the world of things, one gets caught up 
in the shapes of our experience and the 
conventions of our ways of knowing 
things. As soon as we attempt to grasp 
them with our mind’s eye, things tend 
to hide from our senses. This means 
that there is a paradox of presence that 
makes itself absent in what constitutes 
the life of things. We can only be 
touched by this world of things when 
we allow them to reveal themselves, 
rather than imposing ourselves on 
them. Otherwise, the thing itself 
retreats to the background.  
 
Zu den Sachen selbst? 
Art bears a similarity to philosophy in 
that it attempts to undress the dressed-
up codifications of the ways in which 
we perceive the world. This 
necessitates self-research. ‘Γνῶθι 
σεαυτόν (gnothi seauton)’ - know 
thyself, is in a sense, the source for 
both. As such, investigating the 
medium has always been at the core of 
both fields: where early modern 
philosophy investigated the role of ‘the 
room of consciousness’ in our place 
and perspective on the world, art 
investigated the potential of 
perspective; where the philosophers of 
the enlightenment investigated the 
nature of our senses in their relation to 
knowledge, the impressionist 
movement investigated the nature of 
visual perception in its construction of 
our experience of the world; where the 
linguistic philosophy of the 20th 
century investigated the influence of 
the structure of language on our world, 
pop art investigated the role of cultural 
clichés on our worldviews. And in all 
these cases, investigating the nature of 
human existence and the nature of the 
world has always implied an 
investigation of the medium. But then, 
what is ‘medium’? Is language a 
medium? Are images a medium? Is 
paint a medium? Is the alphabet a 
medium? Are our senses a medium? Is 
our mind a medium? In a sense, they 
are not. They all call into existence 
dichotomies that are not truly there: 
the mind does not mediate between 
impressions and knowledge; our senses 
do not mediate between a world of 
things and a world of awareness; the 
alphabet does not mediate between a 
world of concepts and a world of 
words; paint does not mediate between 
what is imaged and what is 
represented; and images do not 
mediate between what is ‘there’ and 
what is ‘viewed’. This means that any 
investigation that solely investigates 
the medium is doomed to erode into a 
self-reflexive solipsism. We must direct 
our gaze elsewhere.  
A turning ‘back to the affairs 
themselves’ seems to echo the notion 
of things upon themselves, and as 
such, this seems to contradict 
Husserl’s original reduction of all to 
appearance. Husserl’s adage ‘Zu den 
Sachen Selbst’ is thus often interpreted 
not a turn to the world of things - in 
the jargon of the field, not as an 
ontological reorientation. Husserl’s 
philosophy holds an ambiguous 
relation to the object. As he puts it: 
“[O]ne must not let oneself be 
deceived by speaking of the physical 
thing as transcending consciousness or 
as ’existing in itself.’ [...] An object 
existing in itself is never one with 
which consciousness or the Ego 
pertaining to consciousness has 
nothing to do” (Husserl 1982, 106).  
Thus, we must agree that we need to 
read Husserl’s call a call to move away 
from a philosophy of interpretation, a 
philosophy that deals with philosophy. 
And indeed, in that day and age, many 
philosophers had descended into an 
abstract study of concepts: a 
philosophy of philosophy; a mere 
citationist historiography of 
philosophical positions and 
counterpositions. In this view, 
Husserl’s contribution to philosophy 
was his assertion that it is impossible 
to step through the veil of the world’s 
appearances. In the view of most 
Husserl scholars, we cannot step into 
the reality of things, and should no 
longer speculate over the nature of the 
world outside of how it appears to us: 
a phenomenological approach (after 
phaenomenon – Greek for 
‘appearance’) necessitates that we put 
‘reality’ between brackets – at least in 
so far as we take our access to it for 
granted.  
Whilst we aspire to know things in the 
world as they are, we can only know 
them in how they appears to us: there 
is no ‘world-in-itself-to-us’, to use 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s words. How it 
‘is’ escapes. Things therefore 
necessarily appear as nothing more 
than phenomena: appearances that are 
negotiated through our experience and, 
after this phase, discursive 
interpretations thereof. Researching 
them demands a step inwards, not a 
naïve belief in the outwards gaze. But, 
if Husserl does not believe in a ‘realism 
of things’, it is almost implied that we 
should be satisfied with remaining in 
Plato’s grotto. How then can we fit 
this position with the adage to return 
‘zu den Sachen selbst’?  
I would not like to ‘do battle with’ the 
schools of thought that deal with this 
issue here, but I need to. If I need to 
adhere to the view that ‘zu den Sachen 
selbst’ means nothing more than a 
‘cleansing of our mind from mistaken 
conventions’, whilst still being a 
prisoner of the chamber of 
consciousness, I cannot go along with 
Husserlian thought. But, knowing 
Husserl’s preoccupation with 
Descartes’ problematic dualist 
philosophy (I doubt, I think, I am, thus 
there is a me, thus there is a world, 
thus there is a separation between me 
and world, thus I know there are 
things etc.) I cannot imagine him as a 
philosopher choosing for a solipsist 
cage of the individual mind.  
The mind is relative. One might say: Í 
think therefore I am not’. And it is in 
the abolishment of thinking that we 
can be aware of more than our 
conventions. For the average 
Husserlian and posthusserlian 
philosopher, ‘reality’ is a term 
stemming from a defunct, obsolete 
metaphysics. For them, there is only 
the world as it appears to us, through 
the limitations of our senses and the 
conventions of our interpretative 
schemata. Reality then is a naïve 
assumption of a more primitive type of 
philosopher. However, some deem this 
interpretation of phenomenology to be 
mistaken.  
In his ‘Ideen’, Husserl posits: “It is 
[…] fundamentally erroneous to 
believe that perception (and, after its 
own fashion, any other kind of 
intuition of a physical thing) does not 
reach the physical thing itself” (Ideen 
1, § 43). Consciousness does reach the 
physical things. And as such, these 
physical things themselves also reach 
us. This assertion however does 
endanger the eidetic reduction – the 
reduction of all possible valid 
knowledge to an honest assessment of 
what appears to us - if understood 
from a realist’s perspective. But the 
appearance is not a moment of 
solipsistic world-interpretation, it is a 
meeting with the real.  
Husserl wanted to avoid a philosophy 
that would revert to mere self-
referential conundrum. The past 
decades, art has suffered from a similar 
self-referentiality as philosophy in 
Husserl’s time, and a similar impotence 
to step out of this self-referentiality. In 
the latter period of the 20th century art 
mostly concentrated on producing 
work that stresses the texture of 
context, the discursive arena in which 
art emerges and receives its meaning. It 
has taken a path of dematerialization 
of its practices (Joshua Simon), aiming 
at an exchange of ideas rather than a 
showing of objects; research on the 
level of interpretation and meaning 
rather than on the level of matter. 
With this objective, it is closely wed to 
postmodern schools of thought that 
emerged in the slipstream of 
structuralism in linguistic philosophy, 
such as (de)constructivism, 
(post)structuralism and 
(post)semiotics. We might also call 
such art ‘hypothetical art’. 
Hypothetical art is art that only 
produces: half-mades for possible 
artefacts. In such art, the conceptual 
experiment behind and after these is 
the true work of art. 
In stressing the textu(r)al nature of our 
reality, and analyzing the underlying 
structures of our understanding of 
reality as more fundamental than that 
reality itself, the above schools of 
thought tend to reduce things to 
contextu(r)ality, thus robbing us of the 
ability to experience their 'thingly' 
nature. As such, they echoed the death 
of metaphysics (as the philosophy of 
being) and its replacement by the 
discursive, something already 
premeditated by Ludwig Feuerbach. 
As early as 1848, he stated that his age 
held ‘a preference for the sign to the 
thing signified, the copy to the original, 
fancy to reality, the appearance to the 
essence’ (from: ‘The Essence of 
Christianity’, foreword to the second 
print).  
The stressing of copy, the image and 
the reproducible had an enormous 
impact on society. The invention of 
photography seemed to obliterate the 
mimetic raison d’être for art. Art 
needed to establish another dominant 
motive. For the impressionists this 
would be direct visual experience, for 
the expressionist, self-expression . 
Both necessitated a stern and critical 
self-investigation. And both inevitably 
led to an investigation of how that self 
is shaped by preexisting conventions.  
During the 19th and 20th centuries, 
reality is increasingly pushed to the 
background by the increasing focus on 
our ways of producing perceptions, 
reproducing objects and interpreting 
experience. Still, both in art and in 
philosophy, a discomfort with this 
‘teriarisation’ of the real has 
continuously led to attempts to 
acknowledge some place for it at the 
fringes of its systems. Thus Duchamp 
shows us objects robbed of their 
original function, rendering them back 
their thingly nature, whilst Magritte 
deconstrued the image by stressing its 
ambiguous character. In philosophy, 
similar views can be found: Husserl’s 
unexpected admission that things can 
indeed be intuited mirrors the ideas of 
other philosophers of the early 20th 
century such as Henri Bergson (his 
‘essay on the immediate givenness to 
conscience’ is a key publication on the 
topic). But from another perspective, it 
is naive to take it for granted that our 
perceptions are not mediated by social, 
historical, cultural and linguistic 
conventions. Acknowledging and 
articulating this naivety triggered the 
linguistic turn in philosophy. And as 
such, it may have become self-centered 
and infertile.  
Where many interprets of Husserl 
insists that to direct ourselves to the 
affairs themselves will always mean to 
direct our gaze inwards, Husserl 
himself, specifically in his later work 
asks us to direct our gaze outwards 
again. This is also at stake for 
speculative realist or neomaterialist 
approaches in art.  
 
The image and the real 
Real things, or ‘the thingly real’, cannot 
be conceptualised. It can only be met 
in direct sensory experience. The 
prioritisation of the image over the real 
in art deceives us: we blinded ourselves 
to the real. It is in the nature of things 
to resist the conventions of perception 
and interpretation. The thing’s 
presence is anti-present, and therefore 
ambiguous in its impenetrable 
materiality. But the thing, as it stands 
upon itself, was never absent. It is 
merely so that both in philosophy and 
in conceptual art we have been led to 
disregard the absolute encounter of the 
immediate sense.  
Several mainstreams in contemporary 
art are taking a step away from the 
conceptual, the virtual and the ideal. In 
other words, they take up a practice 
that reinvestigates the nature of the 
real. In art, a renewed focus on the 
material versus the conceptual is taking 
place. This represents an ontological 
move away from conceptual art. It is 
ontological since it focuses on the 
being of beings, rather than on ideas, 
concepts and images; it investigates the 
thingly nature of objects, rather than 
the way they mask themselves in their 
signification to something else. It is an 
attempt to negotiate a place for the 
object, the thing, in its substantial 
nature. As such, art is increasingly 
liberated from its discursive cage, in 
which the only sensible art appeared to 
be art about art about art - a citationist 
reductionism ad absurdum that loses 
all sensitivity to the real. The 
ontological move away from 
postmodernism and poststructuralism 
is a new form of materialism. It is 
typified by an attempt to negotiate a 
place for the object, the thing, in its 
substantial ambiguity. 
 
The hidden life of things 
Husserl’s adage ‘Zu den Sachen selbst’ 
echoes the ‘Ding an sich’ that haunted 
modern epistemology after having 
been first delimited by Immanuel 
Kant. Kant proposed that our ways of 
knowing and experiencing the world 
will always be mediated by our senses, 
our necessary experience of the world 
in terms of space and time and our 
ways of knowing: thus reality upon 
itself, after Kant, remains forever 
beyond the boundaries of our pre-
structured ways of perceiving, 
experiencing and knowing the world. 
Husserl follows Kant in this line of 
thought. But for Kant, in his move to 
the transcendental conditions of 
knowledge, the world as it is upon 
itself remains closed off to our 
knowledge. Husserl refuses this one 
weakness of Kant’s epistemology: to 
conceptualise the inconceivable. Kant 
should not have given it a term at all. 
This would preclude a possibility of 
knowing them, and at the same time 
puts it beyond our experiential 
horizon. And although Husserl’s 
project is aimed at establishing an 
epistemology of knowledge, in this 
sense, it is still truly an ontology of 
things.  
The mind should make use of its 
essential possibility to modestly 
dissolve itself in the face of a universe 
that consists solely of ‘unknowable 
unknowns’. Here we need to 
acknowledge our basic nature as, in the 
words of Rabinadrath Tagore ‘being in 
community with all things’: mortal, 
perishable, dust. Only then, experience 
can be opened up to what hides in 
plain sight .But ‘[t[he whole weight of 
the universe cannot crush out this 
individuality of mine. I maintain it in 
spite of the tremendous gravitation of 
all things. It is small in appearance but 
great in reality. For it holds its own 
against the forces that would rob it of 
its distinction and make it one with the 
dust”. In naming, first the world, then 
the others, then ourselves, we 
conceptualise that amorphous ‘dust’. 
But as a result, it escapes us. Reflection 
does not mediate access to reality, it 
bars it.  
An encounter with the real, an 
identification of the self with the 
sensible, substantial world, cannot take 
place within a mode of consciousness 
that seeks a symbolic relation. It is 
elusive and only exists in its direct, 
momentary symbiosis with our 
experience. It cannot be poured into 
words, symbols or significations.  
Art has the ability to tread where 
reflection cannot. It can reinvestigate 
what ‘things’ are, in their material 
presence or denial thereof. And as 
such, things, whatever their nature 
proper, may still hold a voice in 
themselves that supercedes our 
solipsistic tendencies. This nature is 
ambiguous, in its robust resistance to 
the conventions of perception and 
interpretation. It consists of an 
impenetrable material presence, as real 
things that cannot be conceptualised 
and only be met in direct sensory 
experience. This involves liberating the 
viewer from his conceptual cage by 
liberating the artwork itself from the 
interpretative frames and conventions 
of both artist and viewer.  
 
The hidden life of things is never 
available to the ‘known’. But we are 
continuously touched by the nature of 
things. Their life cannot be 
experienced through the dressed-up 
codifications by either philosophy or 
art. Instead, it is us that need to 
undress, and stand naked in the face of 
the world of things, without 
preconception. 
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